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THE MARITIME BASIS OF
AMERICAN SECURITY IN EAST ASIA
James E. Auer and Robyn Lim
American policy toward East Asia must be based on an understanding ofhow the region’s strategic geography bears on the interests of the United
States as the dominant maritime power. The western Pacific has resumed its role
as the focus of world economic growth, but it is not “all economics now.” East
Asia is the one part of the world where great-power war remains thinkable. That
is because it is the only region where the Cold War left a residue of unresolved
great-power strategic tensions.
Hanging off the eastern edge of Eurasia, the Korean Peninsula (half-island)
continues in its historical role as the focus of great-power rivalry—albeit on the basis
of new configurations of interest. Tension between the United States and
China is growing in relation to the island of Taiwan, a flourishing democracy
located in a key position on the “first island chain,” running down the East Asian
littoral. Farther offshore, China and other regional states contest the ownership
of the scattered reefs and archipelagoes of the East and South China Seas.
These strategic tensions on the East Asian littoral must engage the interests of
the dominant maritime power and all those who rely on
its protection. The United States has obligations to protect
the maritime security of Japan, the world’s second-largest
economy. That is a matter of great convenience to both
parties, as well as to the wider region, since the U.S.-Japan
security treaty provides Japan with maritime protection
in ways that do not disturb Japan’s neighbors. Freedom of
the seas is also an essential interest of the United States in
its strategic capacity as the global offshore balancer.
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THE UNITED STATES AS GLOBAL OFFSHORE BALANCER . . .
In May 1940, with most of Western Europe’s coastline in Hitler’s hands and Brit-
ain threatened with invasion, the United States inherited the British role as the
global offshore balancer. No longer could America enjoy the “free security” pro-
vided for so long, de facto, by the Royal Navy. Since then strategic circumstances
have changed, but strategic interests are remarkably enduring. The United
States, having become the offshore balancer, must take a close interest in what is
happening strategically on the opposite shores of its great ocean moat. Unless
America can maintain a balance of power at both ends of Eurasia and ensure
freedom of the seas, it cannot wage war much beyond its own southern and
northern borders.1
Long before it became the global offshore balancer, America had a vital inter-
est in the balance of power in the western Pacific. The United States became a Pa-
cific power when it acquired Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898. Its need to see a
balance of power struck across the Pacific Ocean was understood by President
Theodore Roosevelt, who was much influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Roose-
velt knew that the Philippines was the nation’s Achilles’ heel: it was too close to
Japan and too far from Hawaii. In 1905, he brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth,
which concluded the Russo-Japanese War after the parties had fought to exhaus-
tion. The equilibrium struck at Portsmouth did not last, because Japan had con-
tinental ambitions that clashed with America’s interest in the “Open Door” to
China. Soon, the U.S. Navy was gaming conflict with Japan. The Pacific War was
not inevitable, but it had its roots in America’s refusal to grant Japan a free hand
in East Asia.
Ever since Portsmouth, the balance of power in East Asia has been up for
grabs. Throughout last century’s global strategic contests—the two world wars
and the Cold War—the East Asian balance remained unsettled. The collapse of
Soviet power brought equilibrium to Western Europe but not to the East Asian
littoral. For reasons of history, culture, and domestic politics, the United States
has been facing the wrong way strategically since it won the Cold War—toward
Europe rather than the western Pacific. Still fighting the last war, America risks
forgetting to deter the next.
The United States, because it is the offshore balancer, cannot tolerate a bid for
hegemony over Eurasia or any of its critical parts. China, not Russia, is the cur-
rent chief aspirant. To concede hegemony to China would mean that the United
States would have little influence over what happens in East Asia and would be
forced to operate there on terms set by Beijing. History’s lesson is that a mari-
time power cannot concede dominance over vital seas to any rising power with a
continent-sized base on the opposite shore. To do so invites strangulation and
ultimately invasion. In its long history as the offshore balancer, the United
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Kingdom stood at greatest risk of invasion—in 1588 and 1940—when a state
dominant on the continent developed sufficient maritime power to threaten the
British in their island redoubt.
. . . AN OCEAN AWAY FROM THE EAST ASIAN LITTORAL
The Pacific is the widest of the world’s oceans, larger than the Indian and Atlan-
tic Oceans combined. Located as it is in the Western Hemisphere, the United
States cannot hope to maintain a balance of power across the vast reaches of the
Pacific unless it has access to bases on or just off the East Asian littoral. That is
why America’s alliance with Japan rests on a congruence of strategic interests: in
return for providing the United States with bases—which also provide access for
a range of regional contingencies—Japan is afforded maritime and nuclear pro-
tection. Japan is an industrialized but resource-poor archipelago barely off the
littoral, dependent on long sea routes for vital energy imports from the Persian
Gulf. The uncontested exercise of hostile maritime power by any littoral state
would rapidly bring Japan to heel, without need for invasion.
The United States, in the interests of its own security and that of Japan, can-
not grant China a free hand in East Asia. It simply cannot afford to accept that in
East Asia its “ability to ensure regional stability through forward presence and
the deployment of naval power may be nearing an end.”2
WHY TAIWAN MATTERS
Taiwan is the current locus of great-power strategic tension, as Berlin was dur-
ing the Cold War. The preservation of Berlin’s independence was a strategic in-
terest of the United States, one that justified the risk of war with Moscow.
Force-balances matter. By providing military capacity adequate to protect the
Western Europeans from Soviet attack, and demonstrating the will to fight if
necessary, the United States ensured that it did not have to go to war with the So-
viet Union. America’s possession of nuclear weapons played a critical role in de-
terring Soviet assertions (based on proximity) of hegemony over Eurasia—the
1948 Berlin airlift providing an early test.
For similar reasons, preservation of Taiwan’s de facto independence is an
American interest that justifies risking war with China. China sees Taiwan as a
renegade province that it has the right to bring to heel, by force if necessary. No
one in the current leadership in Beijing wants to go down in history as having
lost Taiwan, which all see slipping away. But if China were to succeed in taking
Taiwan by force or threat, it would be well on the way to hegemony over East
Asia. Japan would lose confidence in U.S. protection and might opt to go it
alone, developing long-range maritime power and a nuclear capability. That
would be likely to destabilize the region, as others became afraid of Japan and
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started to arm against it. Only by maintaining adequate force levels in the
western Pacific, and demonstrating the will to use them if necessary, can the
United States deter Chinese assertions of regional hegemony made on the basis
of proximity. No doubt, this would have been readily comprehended by the
geostrategist Nicholas Spykman, that great Yale Dutchman, who died in 1942.
MUDDLED THINKING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Strategic geography is enjoying an overdue revival in the United States, but the
United States has not produced another Spykman. Recent analysts of East Asia’s
strategic geography are muddled in their approaches. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for
example, is mistaken when he says that America should focus on moving the pieces
around the Eurasian chessboard.3 To the contrary, as the offshore balancer the
United States must concentrate on controlling the waves on either side of the board.
Brzezinski’s flawed logic helped underpin the misguided eastward expansion
of Nato. It gave reassurance where none was needed, and on a basis unnecessar-
ily antagonistic to Russia. It also played into the hands of Beijing, by distracting
America’s attention from the more pressing strategic problems of East Asia.
Brzezinski’s mistaken assumption that America must seek geostrategic consen-
sus with China in order to gain a political foothold on the Asian mainland also
helped generate President William Clinton’s bizarre notion of “strategic part-
nership” with China.
That notion received support from the dominant school in American politi-
cal science, which has fostered concepts of “bipolarity” between the United
States and China, leading to supposedly shared interests.4 Because they thought
that bipolarity was inherently stable, the “structuralists” thought the Cold War
would go on for ever. They did not see that in the late 1970s the Soviets were out
to win. Unlike, however, the political scientists and his own predecessors,
President Ronald Reagan did correctly perceive Soviet intentions. Reagan also
understood the importance of forthrightly confronting the enemy. That goal in-
formed his strategic programs, including the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Current imaginings of U.S.-China bipolarity are as misguided as the bipolarity
concept was during the Cold War. Their anti-Soviet alliance of convenience hav-
ing dissolved, the United States and China now represent opposed poles of strate-
gic interest in the western Pacific. True, they have some common interests on the
Korean Peninsula—for example, that there should be no war and that neither Ko-
rea should acquire nuclear weapons. However, after the Koreas are reunited, China
and the United States will have even fewer shared interests in the western Pacific.
China already advocates the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula,
as a first step to seeing them removed from the entire western Pacific.
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Nor do East Asia’s strategic tensions arise from so-called “security dilem-
mas”—those analytical dei ex machina—as the arms control fraternity believes.5
The advocates of arms control treat China and Japan as equally likely to cause
problems. What they fail to see is that China has strategic ambitions, while Japan
has strategic anxieties.6 Japan is already starting to feel Chinese strategic pres-
sure on its energy lifeline from the Gulf. Strategic tensions arise from collisions
of interest, not from simple misunderstanding, accident, and so on; they are not
amenable to resolution by confidence-building measures, preventative diplo-
macy, or other arms control panaceas. Deterrence prevents war. Why must these
essential lessons of strategic history be constantly relearned?
MARITIME POWER AND GEOSTRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES
Today’s Sino-U.S. tensions represent the latest round of the historic competition
between maritime and continental powers. Currently, China has little ability to
project power beyond its frontiers. Still, its strategic geography means that
China does not have to become a “peer competitor” of the United States in order
to collide with its vital interests.
The United States can remain an Asian Pacific power only as long as it can
project maritime force across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. It no longer
has bases in the Philippines. Because China, in contrast, enjoys the advantages of
proximity, it does not need to develop maritime power commensurate with that
of the United States in order to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Un-
contested exercise of maritime power in the South China Sea would allow
Beijing to plant its foot on Japan’s resource jugular; then, calculating that Japan
could feel compelled to comply, China might insist that Japan evict the United
States from its bases there.
It is also important to read history with an eye to geostrategic asymmetries.
Throughout the last century’s great strategic contests, the dominant land pow-
ers did not seek hegemony at sea, because it was not a prerequisite for hegemony
on land. What they sought was sufficient maritime power to deter the offshore
balancer from playing its traditional role—which was to prevent a continental
power from achieving hegemony over Europe/Eurasia.
Drawing analogies between Germany in the years leading up to the First
World War and China now, Robert Ross notes that Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s
“risk fleet” was bound to fail, because Germany could never have developed suf-
ficient naval capabilities to threaten British maritime supremacy.7 But that
misses the point. The “risk fleet’s” purpose was not to challenge the Royal Navy
all around the globe; rather, Germany sought to challenge the British navy
specifically in the North Sea, in order to prevent Britain from being able to play
its traditional role of offshore balancer in Europe. That was all Germany needed
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to do to win. Commanding the central geographical position in Europe, Ger-
many had advanced military and technological capabilities. Had the “risk
fleet” been able to preoccupy the
Royal Navy in the North Sea, Ger-
many would have succeeded in gain-
ing hegemony over Europe. With
the resources of Europe at its com-
mand, Germany would have eventu-
ally developed sufficient maritime power to invade the British Isles. Britain’s
accelerated dreadnought-construction program registered that it perceived the threat.
For similar reasons, after the fall of France in 1940 the United States had no
choice but to inherit the British role as offshore balancer. Although isolationism
remained powerful in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt under-
stood the threat posed by Hitler’s overthrow of the balance of power in Europe.
So he pushed through an accelerated program to build a two-ocean navy.
In the Cold War, geostrategic asymmetries meant that the USSR did not need
to match the American navy in order to win. The Soviet Union already com-
manded the dominant position in Eurasia. That was a consequence of the way
the Second World War had ended;8 when the fighting stopped, the Red Army
had been dangerously close to hegemony over Europe.9 In the 1970s, Moscow
was so encouraged by its achievement of strategic nuclear parity and by the U.S.
post-Vietnam strategic paralysis that it thought it could win the Cold War. Ad-
miral Sergei Gorshkov, Russia’s answer to Mahan, began to develop a Soviet
blue-water capability—the Soviet version of the kaiser’s “risk fleet.”
The Soviet Union, given its commanding position in Eurasia, did not need to
develop maritime power equal to America’s in order to challenge the United
States for first place in the world hierarchy. Rather, it sought sufficient power at
sea to deter the United States from playing the role of offshore balancer; that was
all that Moscow needed in order to win. Like Admiral Tirpitz before him, Admi-
ral Gorshkov did not set out to challenge the dominant global maritime power
all over the world; had the Soviet Union developed sufficient maritime power to
make the United States unable to keep the sea lanes open to Western Europe,
Moscow would have won the Cold War.10 That was why Admiral Gorshkov’s
push for a blue-water navy represented a threat the United States could not af-
ford to ignore. President Reagan’s maritime strategy registered Washington’s
understanding of the point—just as the British had met the German challenge
before the First World War with the dreadnought program, and President
Franklin Roosevelt had responded to the fall of France with the two-ocean navy.
We have probably seen the end of the grand strategic competitions for
superiority over Eurasia that propelled the United States into the box seat.
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America, called upon in two world wars and the Cold War to redress the balance
of power in Europe, achieved definitive success in the Cold War. In the latter it
defeated the Soviet Union, while Britain, France, Germany, and Japan all de-
pended on the United States for their ultimate security.
But strategic history has not ended. Like the ambitions of Admirals von
Tirpitz and Gorshkov, China’s ambition to develop a blue-water navy does not
signal an intention to develop maritime power in order to challenge the domi-
nant maritime power all over the globe. Rather, China—which occupies the cen-
tral geographic position on the mainland—seeks to develop sufficient maritime
power to deter the United States from playing the role of offshore balancer in
East Asia. Through purchases of sophisticated Russian equipment, China is
seeking to develop “asymmetrical capabilities” intended to deter U.S. aircraft
carriers from intervening in a Taiwan crisis.
History may not repeat itself, but some patterns are too obvious to ignore. If
China thinks it can enact another Pearl Harbor by attacking or even sinking a
U.S. carrier, Beijing ought to reflect on the consequences for Japan of the events
of 7 December 1941.
CHINA: A RISING CONTINENTAL POWER WITH
BLUE-WATER AMBITION
China does not represent a threat anything like that once posed by the Soviet
Union, when the USSR possessed huge military power and stretched across
Eurasia, threatening U.S. allies at both ends of that landmass. Nor has China
suddenly become powerful. Still, it is enjoying a strategic latitude unprece-
dented in modern times, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the with-
drawal of Soviet forward-deployed forces from Mongolia, and the ending of the
Soviet alliance with Vietnam. Pointing strategically eastward and southward,
China is pressing on its maritime frontiers in the East and South China Seas.
China is unwilling to consider the rights and interests of others; it is focused on its
own sense of entitlement and historical grievance. The parallels with Japan in the
1930s are striking.
China wants and needs no allies, because its strategic needs are regional
and concentrated. It requires only a regional military capability, supported by
a credible minimum nuclear deterrent as a shield against nuclear blackmail.
In contrast, because the United States is the offshore balancer, it needs large re-
sources of maritime power, nuclear weapons, bases, and allies. These require-
ments arise from strategic necessity, not hubris, although China does not see it
that way.
China’s vast territorial claims, turned on and off at will, in the South China
Sea are fueled by a drive for power and resources. China is pressing on the vital
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Malacca Straits, which link the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from both directions.
At the western entrance to the Strait, China has a strategic foothold in the Coco
Islands, owned by friendless Burma. At the eastern entrance to the Strait, China’s
claims extend as far south as the Natuna Islands, which guard the approaches to
Java, heartland of the Indonesian Archipelago.11
Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia’s other great archipelago, the
Philippines, has been a weak link in the offshore island chain. By requiring in
1991 that the United States leave its naval base at Subic Bay, the Philippines
stretched U.S. strategic mobility; it also did much to embolden China. A year
later, the Chinese rubber-stamp parliament reasserted China’s extensive claims
in the East and South China Seas—including, by implication, the right to use
force against U.S. allies. Central to China’s new assertiveness were the ideas of
the then-commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Admiral Liu Huaqing,
China’s answer to Mahan.12 In 1995, China’s grab of Mischief Reef in the Spratly
archipelago came to light. China has since proceeded to fortify the reef, claiming
that it is merely building fishermen’s shacks. Mischief Reef, which is also claimed
by the Philippines, is well within the Philippines’ two-hundred-mile exclusive
economic zone. It is unlikely that China would have seized the reef had the U.S.
Navy still been in Subic.
The Philippines, which has virtually no navy of its own, has long sought to
entangle America in its claims in the South China Sea.13 However, the United
States has no obligation to support Philippine claims in the Spratlys; it has no in-
terest in the ownership of these scattered reefs and archipelagoes. But it does
have a vital interest in maritime passage through the South China Sea—both on
its own account as the offshore balancer, and because of its commitments to Ja-
pan’s resource security. The United States also has an essential interest in deter-
ring China from making threats against its allies. America’s mutual security
treaties with Japan and the Philippines tie it to issues of strategic contention in
both the East and South China Seas.
In 1995–96, a tepid American response to China’s reassertions of its territo-
rial claims in the South China Sea encouraged China to go farther: it probed to-
ward the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Japan has
long claimed these islands, whereas China became interested in them only in the
1970s, when there seemed a prospect of oil deposits nearby. After the Second
World War, the United States administered the Senkakus as part of Okinawa and
developed a bombing range there. It handed over their administration to Ja-
pan when Okinawa was returned in 1972, thus continuing to include the
Senkakus, de jure, within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Nonetheless,
the Clinton administration, for fear of offending China, refused to acknowledge
publicly that the Senkakus come within the treaty’s ambit. That further
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emboldened China; it is not surprising that China’s probes around the Senkakus
and Okinawa increased. China has even become bold enough to send surveillance
vessels through the Tsugaru Strait, in the heart of the Japanese archipelago.14
In 1996, China “ratified” the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as if
it were an archipelagic state, which it was not entitled to do. Further, it drew
archipelagic baselines around the Paracel Islands, which it took from Vietnam
by force in 1974, to prevent their falling into the hands of North Vietnam,
China’s supposed ally at the time—a nice example of realpolitik. In 1988, Chi-
nese and Vietnamese forces clashed in the Spratlys.
For China, taking the Paracels was a pushover; the more distant Spratlys are
not. China, having learned lessons from the demise of the Soviet Union, is devel-
oping its military capabilities at a modest pace that does not outrun economic
growth. But China no doubt intends, once it has developed longer-range mari-
time capabilities (including sophisticated Russian military technology), to pick
off the other claimants one by one.
The Clinton administration persisted in seeing these sources of strategic con-
tention in the East and South China Seas as legal issues, whereas in fact they are
strategic issues with legal faces. If the United States continues to ignore its equity
in these islands, it is only a matter of time before China makes an archipelagic
claim to the whole of the Spratlys.
WOBBLES TO THE SOUTH
China sees time as a strategic asset, in the way that the Soviet Union saw space
(distance, that is, not kosmos) as a strategic asset. Beijing seeks to convince the
Southeast Asians that time is on its side. “Remember Saigon,” the Chinese say;
“the Americans are unreliable and may leave, but China will be here for ever.”
Thus the Southeast Asians are urged to accommodate Beijing now, lest the price
of future accommodation be made higher.
The Southeast Asians have not been completely supine, and some seek to
keep America actively engaged in their region. Thailand conducts annual mili-
tary exercises (COBRA GOLD) with the United States, and Singapore joined in
recently. Singapore, the region’s geostrategic pivot because of its vital position in
the Malacca Straits, is building a berth at Changi Naval Base to accommodate
U.S. aircraft carriers. It also bases much of its air force in Australia, a U.S. ally.
Both Malaysia and Singapore participate in the Five Power Defence Arrange-
ments, which provide an umbrella under which they can cooperate with each
other and with Western powers.15 Under the auspices of the FPDA, Royal Austra-
lian Air Force F/A-18 aircraft regularly deploy to Butterworth in northern Ma-
laysia; also, Australian maritime surveillance aircraft operating from
Butterworth conduct missions over the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
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Even the Philippine senate, which voted in 1991 to evict the U.S. Navy from
Subic Bay, caught a whiff of realpolitik when China started to build its base on
Mischief Reef; in 1999, the senate approved a new Visiting Forces Agreement
that will allow U.S. ship visits.
In general, however, confronted with a rising China, the Southeast Asians are
wobbly. The U.S. Navy, for instance, will not be returning to Subic Bay as a base;
Philippine miscalculation has done much to let China into the South China Sea.
China enjoys the advantages of centrality, as its history as the Middle Kingdom
shows. It also has size, demographic weight, and nuclear weapons. Unlike Japan
and Australia, the Southeast Asians do not enjoy the benefits of extended nu-
clear deterrence. They know that China, as a permanent member of the UN Se-
curity Council, could veto any reaction under the Charter to an aggression by
China itself.
Rising tension between China and America worries the Southeast Asians, and
they dread being forced to choose sides. They are unsure of how much they
could depend on external support, were they to stand up to China, or what
might result, such as a militarily stronger Japan. Except for Singapore, they have
been forced by the recession to reduce their military spending, while China’s has
gone on unabated. Most states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are
fragmented societies, and the economic downturn has exposed many fissures
within them. The economic power of China’s diaspora worries them, and many
fear its fifth-column potential.
Even the five founding members of ASEAN have been squabbling, undermin-
ing any notion that the association could act as a bulwark of regional stability.16
Indonesia, the primus inter pares in Southeast Asia, remains in post-Suharto tur-
moil and could break up; growing secessionist pressures in its outer islands re-
flect weakness at the center. For all these reasons, the Southeast Asians have been
unable to combine in defense of their interests in the South China Sea. They con-
tinue to pursue conflicting territorial claims there. That has allowed China to di-
vide and rule, even in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China also uses the ARF
as a forum for alliance busting: it argues that because the Cold War is over, the re-
gion no longer needs America’s alliance system or its forward-based forces.17
ASEAN AND TAIWAN: SEE NO EVIL
The Southeast Asians know that China is steadily building up its missiles oppo-
site Taiwan and that China has implicitly threatened Taiwan with nuclear weap-
ons. Yet they profess to see no connection between their own security and the
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996,
China sought to intimidate Taiwan as it held its first direct presidential elections.
It lobbed nuclear-capable missiles within a few miles of Taiwan’s ports, some of
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them landing close to Japan’s outer islands.18 The United States responded by
dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups, led respectively by the USS Nimitz
(CVN 68) and Independence (CV 62), to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. How-
ever, ASEAN was mute, except for mild complaint from Singapore.
In the wake of Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 2000, which saw the
ruling Kuomintang replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party, led by Chen
Shui-bian, the reaction of ASEAN has, again, been silence. Ignoring China’s
bluster and threats against Taiwan before the elections—which proved counter-
productive in any case—Singapore’s senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew, even
implied that Taiwan was at fault for “provoking” China and declared that reuni-
fication is inevitable.19
Lee should look over his shoulder. If China has the right to reintegrate Taiwan
by force, does not Malaysia have the right to reintegrate Singapore by the same
means? Lee seems unable to comprehend that the United States, in the interests
of its own security and that of Japan, cannot afford to let China take Taiwan by
force. If that happened, who in East Asia would feel safe? The fates of Taiwan and
Singapore, those wealthy ethnically Chinese islands off East Asia’s edge, are inex-
tricably linked, but Lee cannot seem to see it. Thus Southeast Asia’s senior states-
man plays into the hands of Beijing, which flatters Singapore as a model of a
market economy with party control. Also, of course, the democratic transition
in Taiwan, the first in the long history of the Chinese people, is an affront to au-
thoritarian Singapore.
No one expects ASEAN to stand up and shout at Beijing, but by professing to
see no stake in Taiwan’s continued de facto independence, it emboldens China.
Still, its timidity is no reason for the United States to give up on it. Indeed, the
United States cannot afford to do so, in the interests either of its own maritime
security or of Japan’s need for maritime protection.
JAPAN’S NEED FOR MARITIME PROTECTION
Commodore Matthew C. Perry, U.S. Navy, demonstrated in 1853 the vulnera-
bilities of an archipelagic state when he trained the guns of his “black ships” on
the decayed Tokyo forts—even though trade, not conquest, was his purpose.
Archipelagic states are especially susceptible to the exercise of hostile maritime
power because of the ease with which such power can be brought to bear against
their capitals. Japan took the point. If it wished to avoid the fate of China, which
the European powers were carving up into zones of influence, Japan could no
longer seek security in self-imposed isolation. After 1868, the Meiji Restoration
rapidly brought Japan into the global system, as a third center of economic and
military power, after Europe and the United States.
A U E R A N D L I M 4 9
11
Auer and Lim: The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Because Japan is an island nation, its ambitions on the continent after 1905
were discretionary; they did not arise from strategic necessity. After the
Russo-Japanese War, which ended in that year, Japan had all it needed—it had
blocked the Russian threat via Korea and Manchuria; it enjoyed access to the re-
sources of Manchuria; and it had an alliance with Great Britain, the dominant
maritime power. By pursuing nonetheless its ambitions in China, Japan suc-
ceeded only in undermining its security. As it advanced down the China coast,
Japan increasingly came into collision with the two key East Asian interests of a
great industrial and maritime power having a continent-sized base in the Western
Hemisphere: America’s stake in the Open Door to China and in the security of the
Philippines led it to refuse to concede hegemony over East Asia to Japan.
The 1941–45 Pacific War demonstrated in spades Japan’s vulnerability to
hostile maritime power, a fact that the atomic bombings have tended to obscure.
Japan was strangled by a combination of the U.S. Navy’s fast carriers, fleet train,
amphibious assault forces, and submarines, and Army Air Force long-range
bombers flying from island bases seized by assault from the sea.20 While much of
the Japanese army was still thrashing about in China, to no strategic purpose,
American maritime power took Japan by the front door.
Prostrate, postwar Japan was vulnerable to the combined forces of the great
land powers of East Asia, the Soviet Union and China, who became allies in
1950. Indeed, their alliance was specifically pointed at Japan. As early as 1942,
Spykman had foreseen the need for the United States to protect postwar Japan
against the Soviet Union, whose Pacific face had long given it opportunities and
ambition. The need to defend Japan was one of America’s main reasons for en-
tering the Korean War; the United States could not afford to let the only indus-
trialized country in Asia fall to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Japan, assured of American
maritime protection as long as it agreed to provide bases for the United States,
was freed to concentrate on economic recovery. In turn, that helped the rest of
noncommunist East Asia to recover.
JAPAN’S ROLE IN WINNING THE COLD WAR
During the Cold War, Japan was neither an economic threat to the United States
nor a free rider, as so many now seem to think. To the contrary, Japan played an
important role in bringing down the overextended Soviet empire.
Japan’s geostrategic location made it a vital link in a global chain of maritime
power that depended critically on nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming So-
viet proximate power in Europe. In order to bring countervailing pressure to bear
on the vulnerable eastern flank of the Soviet Union, the United States needed a
combination of East Asian allies, maritime power, and nuclear weapons. Although
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the Cold War had its roots in Europe, over time the East Asian dimension of this
global strategic contest progressively grew in importance.
In the 1980s, Japan’s navy developed significant maritime capability, in con-
junction with President Reagan’s maritime strategy, and the Soviets perceived
that Japan was willing to fight if necessary. The U.S. maritime strategy published
in 1986 was a logical response to the global strategic challenge laid down by the
Soviet Union in the late 1970s.21 In
1979, the fall of the shah of Iran cre-
ated an “arc of crisis” in the Persian
Gulf. British withdrawal from “East
of Suez” brought the Soviet navy hot-
foot into the Indian Ocean, not least
from Vladivostok. Moscow also concocted arms control schemes in the Indian
Ocean. Deeply attractive to India, Moscow’s ally, these regimes aimed at hob-
bling U.S. access to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which was critical
to U.S. ability to reinforce the Gulf.22
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow’s support for Cuban
surrogates in Africa reflected the Kremlin’s belief that the “correlation of forces”
was moving decisively in its favor. The Soviet Union also tried to intimidate Ja-
pan by stationing a division of troops in the illegally occupied Japanese “North-
ern Territories” south of the Kurile Islands, visibly threatening Hokkaido. In
addition, two Soviet aircraft carriers were based at Vladivostok, just across the
Sea of Japan.
The maritime strategy envisaged Western navies taking the war to the en-
emy in both the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. Comparative advantage
at sea enabled the United States to exploit the key geostrategic problem of its
continental adversary—Soviet vulnerability to war at both ends of its eight-
thousand-mile east-west axis. Combined with China’s enmity to the Soviet Un-
ion (their alliance, though never formally abrogated, was far from close), the
maritime strategy posed an immense strategic complication for Moscow. It dis-
persed Soviet forces and made credible the threat that war in the West would also
mean war in the East.
To the east, an integral part of the maritime strategy was the development of
an effective, high-technology air defense and antisubmarine network around
the Japanese archipelago. Fully armed Japanese naval aircraft, alternating on a
daily basis with U.S. Navy antisubmarine aircraft, patrolled throughout the Sea
of Japan, upon which lie Vladivostok and other Soviet Pacific Fleet bases. That
convinced Soviet naval commanders that Japan was prepared to fight alongside
the United States if necessary. Officially, the Japanese government’s position was
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that it could not participate in collective self-defense; Japan’s actions sent a dif-
ferent message.
The strategic geography of the Japanese archipelago greatly facilitated the mar-
itime strategy, because Japan could control all the Soviet navy’s exits from its Sea
of Japan bases. By controlling the sea lanes through that sea, the United States and
Japan made it impossible for the Soviets to feel confident that they could, in war-
time, support their bases at Petropavlovsk and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam;23 all the
critical supplies had to come out of Vladivostok. The two Soviet aircraft carriers
stationed there were also much less capable than the USS Midway (CV 41), based
at Yokosuka. In addition, Japan played its part in ensuring that the global nuclear
balance did not tilt in Moscow’s favor. The U.S. and Japanese navies exploited So-
viet geostrategic problems by threatening the Soviet strategic ballistic missile sub-
marine (SSBN) fleet in its “bastion” in the Sea of Okhotsk.24 (At the other end of
Eurasia, its equivalent was the Barents Sea.)
Japan’s strategic geography also facilitated political management of Japan’s
contribution to the maritime strategy. Japan’s defense of the sea lanes out to a
thousand nautical miles sounded modest and did not arouse undue opposition
at home. The Soviet Union undermined its own objectives by minatory be-
havior that produced a palpable sense of threat in the Japanese public. Amer-
ica’s de facto alliance with China also helped, because Beijing did not oppose
the extension of Japan’s maritime capabilities. That helped mute opposition in
Japan, where the socialists had long sung Beijing’s tune. But the critics were not
so easily silenced in relation to nuclear weapons, a vital adjunct to American
maritime power.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MARITIME POWER: THE COLD WAR
Nuclear weapons are not popular anywhere, least of all in Japan, as a conse-
quence of the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Notwithstanding,
nuclear weapons were vital during the Cold War for the United States, because it
was a distant power that needed to counter Soviet assertions of hegemony, made
on the basis of proximity, over Eurasia. In 1952, the original U.S.-Japan security
treaty gave the United States carte blanche, including the rights to store nuclear
weapons in Japan and to launch them without consultation. A revision of the
treaty in 1960, at Japan’s behest, obliged the United States to consult Japan about
any changes to be made in the equipment of U.S. forces in Japan.
Nuclear weapons were removed from Okinawa when it reverted to Japanese
control in 1972. In 1969, Japan announced its three nonnuclear principles—not
to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them in Japanese terri-
tory—its prime minister Eisaku Sato (1966–72) even winning a Nobel Peace Prize
for his efforts in establishing those principles. Japan’s nonnuclear status preserved
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domestic harmony and also furthered its aspirations to be recognized as a great
power. Japan’s diplomats pursued the objective of nuclear disarmament, seeing it as
Japan’s main claim to permanent membership in the UN Security Council.25
Nonetheless, and sotto voce, Japan continued to rely on extended deterrence.
That seemed even more necessary when China exploded its first nuclear weapon
in 1964. So when nuclear-capable American ships entered Japanese ports, Japan
did not ask, and the United States did not declare, whether such weapons actu-
ally were aboard the warships. How could it have been otherwise in an alliance
critically dependent on nuclear weapons and maritime power?
If Japan had really believed that nuclear weapons were irrelevant to its secu-
rity or represented unacceptable dangers, it could have opted out of the U.S. alli-
ance at any time after 1971.26 It did not do so because the last thing the Japanese
really wanted was to be left alone to cope with China, Russia, and North Korea as
best they could.
Japan’s strategic geography also facilitated political management of nuclear
issues. As long as the United States had submarines capable of targeting the So-
viet maritime provinces, Japan felt no need to have nuclear weapons stationed
on its territory. Thus Japan avoided the political problems associated with inter-
mediate-range nuclear force deployments in Western Europe. There Moscow’s
exploitation of antinuclear sentiment, especially in Germany, came close to
splitting Nato. In 1992, President George Bush’s removal of tactical nuclear
weapons further eased the political management of nuclear issues in Japan. Still,
with the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons lost none of their salience for Ja-
pan’s security.
THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO EAST
ASIAN SECURITY
Even in changed strategic circumstances, some fundamentals of Asia-Pacific
security have not altered. Because it is the offshore balancer, the United States
still needs large resources of maritime power and nuclear weapons in order to
maintain a balance of power in the western Pacific. American nuclear weapons
and maritime power were critical in preventing the Soviet Union from winning
the Cold War on the basis of its assertions of domination over Eurasia. America’s
nuclear and maritime capabilities remain no less important in deterring China’s
designs for hegemony over East Asia. The United States must retain adequate re-
serves of nuclear weapons, resisting the clamor of those who say that nuclear
weapons have no utility now that the Cold War is over. Nuclear weapons, like the
old concept of the “fleet in being,” work all the time as deterrents, simply be-
cause they exist.
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Because Japan cannot rely on its three nonnuclear principles for its strategic
security, the United States must also continue to supply a credible nuclear um-
brella over Japan. India having tested nuclear weapons in 1998, Japan is now the
only Asian great power without them. East Asia’s strategic future will turn on
whether the United States, Japan, and China all continue to believe that the
United States will underwrite Japan’s nuclear and maritime security.
Japan cannot remain unconcerned when China rattles its nuclear-capable
missile arsenal in efforts to intimidate the Taiwanese into submission. Farther
north, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program no doubt continues, as does its
missile program. As the arms controllers tend to forget, the strategic value of any
weapon depends on who owns it. Although North Korea appears somewhat less
odious after the 15 June 2000 Korean summit, its enigmatic (if not irrational)
behavior, which includes the willingness to see millions of its own subjects
starve in order to preserve itself in power, remains largely unchanged.
North Korea’s missiles and nuclear ambiguity have been very useful in black-
mailing the United States and others into large-scale aid to North Korea, in order
to prop up that failed state, an orphan of the Cold War.27 Indeed, the North Kore-
ans seemed to have drawn appropriate conclusions from the Gulf War—that
those who wish to defy the United States should first seek nuclear weapons and
the means of delivery. If the process of Korean reunification is indeed in train, as
now seems possible, Japan will worry that a reunited state might inherit the
North Korean nuclear weapons program. Given the history and geography of
the peninsula, it would not be surprising if a reunified Korea responded to the
nuclear attraction. Would Japan then be content to continue to rely on the U.S.
nuclear umbrella?
The United States must be more attentive to Japan’s legitimate security
needs.28 Pursuing arms control and nonproliferation as objectives in themselves,
as the Clinton administration did, obscures the equations of power in East Asia.
In a region where the balance of power remains unsettled, states seek security
because they must. Japan is no exception, whatever the continuing strength of its
domestic pacifism.29
TOWARD AN ALLIANCE THAT IS READY TO FIGHT AT SEA
Many of the strategic lessons of the Cold War either were not understood in both
Japan and the United States or were rapidly forgotten. Since then, the U.S.-Japan
alliance has been allowed to drift because of lack of consistent attention at the
top in both countries. It now urgently needs an overhaul.
The Japanese government ducked its responsibilities to explain to its public
the role that Japan played in maritime strategy. As a result, Japan was unpre-
pared to respond adequately to the 1990–91 Gulf War. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
5 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/4
and the threat posed to Saudi Arabia represented palpable menaces to Japan,
given its need for resource security. But because the threat was distant, few in Ja-
pan seemed to perceive it. Japan dithered, threw money at the problem, and
eventually sent four minesweepers to the Strait of Hormuz—after the war was
over.30 It got little thanks, even from Kuwait. Had the war gone on longer or
American casualties been higher, the U.S.-Japan alliance could have ruptured.31
Reading the lessons of the Gulf War, the United States moved to shore up its
alliance with Japan. It also recognized the economic importance of East Asia
and the critical fact that the power balance there remained unsettled. For those
reasons, it kept force reductions in the region to a minimum. At the other end of
Eurasia, the restoration of equilibrium as a consequence of the collapse of Soviet
power made it possible for Western Europe to absorb dramatic U.S. force reduc-
tions without compromising security. That was not the case in East Asia; accord-
ingly, the United States reaffirmed its intention to maintain a hundred thousand
forward-deployed troops in East Asia, the same number as in Europe.
Thus it was that the United States encouraged Japan to pursue a more
outward-looking security policy and to develop the resources needed to sustain
it. New U.S.-Japan defense guidelines now allow a modest amount of Japanese
rear-echelon support in emergencies in “areas surrounding Japan”—which
means Korea and Taiwan. Japan has also agreed to cooperate with the United
States in the development of theater missile defenses, including the Aegis
ship-based system, though China rails against it.
But these changes represent only modest improvements. The Gulf War showed
the need to readjust the offensive and defensive roles that the United States and
Japan, respectively, would need to play in any regional contingency. The alliance
remains exposed to a contingency in Korea or the Taiwan Strait. If Americans
start taking casualties and Japan does not do enough to help, political support in
the United States for the alliance could rapidly evaporate.
The critical thing Japan needs to do is to move away from the illogical notion
that while it has the right to collective self-defense, its (American-written) con-
stitution does not permit the exercise of that right.32 That notion means, at least
in theory, that if Japanese ships were patrolling with the U.S. Navy and only the
American ships were attacked, Japanese ships could not fight in their defense.
That absurd interpretation cannot be allowed to persist. It flies in the face of ev-
erything we have learned about deterrence—that status-quo powers who look as
if they are willing to fight rarely need to do so.
The current situation is even more absurd in that Japan has a navy second
only to that of the United States itself, albeit one without power-projection ca-
pabilities. Japan has not only a real navy but a unique maritime potential in East
Asia. Oddly, this has escaped attention. A recent analysis of East Asia’s strategic
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geography quoted Mahan: “History has conclusively demonstrated the inability
of a state with even a single continental frontier to compete in naval develop-
ment with one that is insular, although of smaller population and resources.”33
But the quotation was made in relation to China, not Japan.
Japan, unlike Asia’s other great powers, does not suffer from the immense
strategic distraction of potential enemies on land frontiers. It is allied with the
dominant maritime power, as it was in the years from 1902 to 1922. The differ-
ence is that this time Japan is not using its alliance as a shield while it pursues
ambition on the continent. Also, this time Japan is working in concert with the
great maritime and industrial power based in the Western Hemisphere, not
against it.
Together, the United States and Japan are providing security for almost the
entire western Pacific while spending, respectively, only 3 and 1 percent of gross
national product on defense. They must think, however, and act more strategi-
cally, which is always hard for democracies when they do not face palpable
threats. For reasons that have been laid out in this article, both the United States
and Japan have vital national interests at stake in the preservation of Taiwan’s de
facto independence. In a future Taiwan crisis, it should be possible for an Ameri-
can president to ask that Japanese warships accompany an American task force
sailing from Yokosuka, and for a Japanese prime minister to assent. If such
complementarity were to become operationally credible, it would not launch Ja-
pan on the road to revived militarism. To the contrary, it would credibly
strengthen deterrence under a U.S.-Japan umbrella, to the benefit of the entire
Asia-Pacific community.
N O T E S
1. Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The
Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New
York: Free Press, 1992), p. 276.
2. Douglas Porch, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of
1996: Strategic Implications for the United
States Navy,” Naval War College Review,
Summer 1999, p. 16.
3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard:
American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imper-
atives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
4. Despite global unipolarity, East Asia is held to
be bipolar, divided into continental and mar-
itime regions. Bipolarity is held to be stable.
Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace:
East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” Inter-
national Security, Spring 1999, p. 82.
5. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan
Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East
Asia,” International Security, Spring 1999,
pp. 49–80.
6. The same arguments are currently being recy-
cled in relation to ballistic missile defenses. BMD
opponents represent the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty as a cornerstone of stra-
tegic stability. Its abrogation, they say, would
cause security dilemmas and an “arms race.”
Only if one accepts the mad logic of mutually
assured destruction (MAD)—the virtue of
self-imposed vulnerability—can one believe
that the ABM treaty is a cornerstone of
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/4
stability. The Soviets never accepted the logic
of MAD, as shown, for example, by the aggres-
sive way in which they pursued their
antisatellite programs, even during the period
of high détente. But they did seize the oppor-
tunity to hobble Western technology. Cur-
rently, in opposing national and theater
missile defense, Russia and China seek to
keep Western technology hobbled, because
they know they cannot compete with it. To
China, the prospect of American and Japa-
nese technological cooperation is especially
unwelcome. But if nuclear competition is to
be the name of the game in East Asia, as
seems likely, the United States should set the
terms, not allow China to do so.
7. Ross, p. 107.
8. In 1942, Spykman foresaw that “a Russian
state from the Urals to the North Sea can be
no great improvement over a German state
from the North Sea to the Urals.” Nicholas
John Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Pol-
itics: The United States and the Balance of Power
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), p. 460.
9. That is why the governments of Western Eu-
rope, many of them quite left-wing at the
time, clamored for American protection.
Ironically, the time that the Europeans were
most afraid was the period of the U.S. nuclear
monopoly (1945–49). But that does not mean,
as many now claim, that nuclear weapons
were irrelevant to the correlation of forces at
the beginning of the Cold War. On the con-
trary, U.S. possession of nuclear weapons,
and its demonstrated will to use them if nec-
essary, gave its allies the confidence to stand
up to Moscow.
10. The strategic geography of the Cold War
largely replicated that of World War II—that
is, conflict in Europe was largely continental,
though dependent on maritime reinforcements.
In the Pacific, in both cases the conflict was
largely maritime.
11. In December 1995, it was the realization that
China’s territorial claims might include the
Natuna Islands, which guard the eastern ap-
proaches to Java, that drove Indonesia into
unprecedented strategic alignment with Aus-
tralia. That alignment did not survive the
1999 East Timor crisis, which saw a sharp dete-
rioration in the Indonesia-Australia relationship
as a consequence of Australia’s UN-autho-
rized military intervention in East Timor.
12. That decision was made over the objections
of the Chinese foreign ministry. Michael
Studeman [Lt., USN], “Calculating China’s
Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying
the Triggers of ‘Expansionism,’ ” Naval War
College Review, Spring 1998, pp. 79–80.
13. The purpose, no doubt, of the Philippine
practice of tearing up Chinese reef markers.
14. Japan Times, 19 May 2000. The strait is an in-
ternational waterway, but the point is China’s
astonishing display of maritime hubris, given
that Japan has a real navy and China does not.
15. Members are Britain, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia, and Singapore. The FPDA was set
up after the British withdrawal from East of
Suez, in order to ameliorate tensions between
Malaysia and Singapore after the latter was
expelled from Malaysia in 1965. It seeks to
create a framework in which the Southeast
Asian parties can cooperate in their external
defense. Its most important element is the In-
tegrated Air Defence System, which has always
been commanded by an Australian wing
commander. Britain’s interest these days
seems to be confined to arms sales.
16. ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
Philippines.
17. Those who promote multilateral solutions for
East Asia seem unaware of how the Soviet
Union used the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe—a child of détente,
now known as the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe—to promote al-
liance busting in Nato. While conceding
nothing in relation to the Warsaw Pact, Mos-
cow gained opportunities to divide and rule
in Nato—by playing on tensions between
Greece and Turkey, fueling German and
Danish nuclear fears, and so on.
18. Japan’s most outlying island in the long chain
off Okinawa, Yonagunijima, is within sight of
Taiwan.
19. “Lee: The Cruel Game,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, 8 June 2000, p. 17.
20. Gray, p. 255.
21. On the Maritime Strategy, see Edward Rhodes,
“‘. . . From the Sea’ and Back Again: Naval
A U E R A N D L I M 5 7
19
Auer and Lim: The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Power in the Second American Century,” Na-
val War College Review, Spring 1999, esp. n. 9.
22. That underlines the importance to Japan’s
maritime interests of the chain of islands that
links Japan with the Gulf. Distance is irrelevant:
any threat to Diego Garcia, Singapore, or
Taiwan represents a mortal threat to Japan.
23. The Soviet Union acquired its base in Cam
Ranh Bay as a reward for backing Vietnam in
its 1978 invasion of Cambodia, China’s ally.
By gaining access to Cam Ranh, Moscow
sought to outflank both China and the United
States in the South China Sea. China then at-
tacked Vietnam, to make the point that Viet-
nam could not rely on the Soviet Union for
its strategic security.
24. Centralist political control—distrust of SSBN
commanders at sea—also helped the develop-
ment of that novel strategic art-form of tying up
SSBNs at wharves in the Sea of Okhotsk and
near Murmansk. The Politburo feared the Hunt
for Red October scenario, wherein an SSBN
commander sought to defect. Similar centralist
fears now hobble China’s drive for “longer legs”
in the Spratlys, since it fears that the pilots of its
Su-27 Flankers—long-range air-superiority air-
craft—might defect to Taiwan.
25. That is an example of needing to be careful
what one wishes for, lest one get it. Would
Japan be safer if the great powers abandoned
their nuclear arsenals? Given the history of
arms control—that bad regimes lie and
cheat—could China and Russia be trusted to
comply? Without nuclear weapons as a vital
adjunct to maritime power, could the United
States continue to underwrite Japan’s strate-
gic security?
26. Japan could not have terminated the original
treaty, but the 1960 revision gave both sides
the option of terminating it after ten years, on
one year’s notice.
27. During the Cold War, the North Koreans
were able to play off the Soviets against
China, getting aid from both. Their current
economic plight is also, of course, a conse-
quence of disastrous policy mistakes and the
callousness of a regime utterly indifferent to
the welfare of its population.
28. A good example of lack of sufficient attention
to Japan’s security needs occurred after the
unannounced launch of North Korea’s
Taepodong-1 missile over the Japanese home
islands in August 1998. What was important
was not the supposed payload, a satellite, but
the improvement in launch capabilities that
had been revealed. The United States should
have seen the parallel with its own experience
with Sputnik in 1957, which showed that all
of the United States was vulnerable to Soviet
missile attack. Instead, the Clinton adminis-
tration saw the North Korean missile launch
through a nonproliferation lens. Because the
United States was unresponsive to Japan’s se-
curity needs, Japan decided to acquire its own
intelligence satellites.
29. See Thomas U. Berger, “Alliance Politics and
Japan’s Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism,”
in The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and
Future, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M.
Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1999), pp. 189–207.
30. Ironically, at least one knowledgeable Japanese
flag officer assessed that the minesweepers
were at greater risk than if they had been sent
earlier, because they arrived so late that the
easy and safer jobs had all been done.
31. For the Japanese response to the Persian Gulf
War, see Peter J. Woolley and Mark S. Woolley,
“The Kata of Japan’s Naval Forces,” Naval War
College Review, Spring 1996, pp. 64–7, and
Katsutoshi Kawano [Capt., JMSDF], “Japan’s
Military Role: Alliance Recommendations for
the Twenty-first Century,” Naval War College
Review, Autumn 1998, esp. pp. 15f.
32. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, which offi-
cially ended the Pacific War, recognized
Japan’s right to collective self-defense, which
the UN Charter also recognizes as a right of
all member states. Prime Minister Nobusuke
Kishi (1957–60) considered collective self-
defense as part of Japan’s natural right to
self-defense. However, his younger brother,
Eisaku Sato, permitted the unelected Cabinet
Legislative Office to proclaim as government
policy that although Japan has the right to col-
lective self-defense as a sovereign nation, Arti-
cle 9 of its constitution forbids the exercise of
that right.
33. Ross, p. 106.
5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/4
